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DISCUSSIONS 
IN DEFENCE OF OBJECT-DEPENDENT 
THOUGHTS 
by Sean Crawford 
ABSTRACT The existence of object-dependent houghts has been doubted on the 
grounds that reference to such thoughts is unnecessary or 'redundant' in the 
psychological explanation of intentional action. This paper argues to the contrary 
that reference to object-dependent thoughts is necessary to the proper psycho- 
logical explanation of intentional action upon objects. Section I sets out the 
argument for the alleged explanatory redundancy of object-dependent houghts; 
an argument which turns on the coherence of an alternative 'dual-component' 
model of explanation. Section II rebuts this argument by showing the dual- 
component model to be incoherent precisely because of its exclusion of 
object-dependent thoughts. Section III concludes with a conjecture about the 
further possible significance of object-dependent houghts for the prediction of 
action. 
Object-dependent thoughts are thoughts about particular objects to 
which the thinker stands in some kind of special relation of 
acquaintance and that are such that they would not be available to be 
thought if those objects did not exist. The very existence and identity of 
an object-dependent hought depends upon the existence and identity of 
the objects it is about.1 The aim of this paper is to defend the thesis that 
A satisfactory psychological explanation of an agent's intentional 
action upon an object must make reference to object-dependent 
thoughts of the agent involving the given object acted upon.2 
and to rebut a recent anti-externalist argument whose conclusion is that 
this thesis is false. 
The Necessity Thesis, or Thesis N, as I shall call it, has recently come 
under attack by a number of internalistically-minded philosophers. Harold 
Noonan, for example, seeks to defend the following contrary claim: 
1. See Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982); John 
McDowell, 'De Re Senses', in C. Wright (ed.), Frege: Tradition and Influence (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1984); John McDowell, 'Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space', 
in P. Pettit and J. McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought, and Context (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986). 
2. Cf. Christopher Peacocke's 'Indispensability Thesis' in his 'Demonstrative Thought and 
Psychological Explanation', Synthese 49 (1981), a paper to which I am indebted. I have also 
been influenced by the ideas that Terrance Tomkow presented in lectures at Dalhousie 
University in 1992/93. 
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Whenever an action is directed towards a concrete, contingently 
existing object, other than its agent, in the sense that it is intentional 
under a description in which there occurs a singular term denoting 
that object, then an adequate psychological explanation of it is 
available under a (possibly distinct) description in which occurs a 
term denoting that object; and in this explanation the only psycho- 
logical states of the agent referred to are ones which would also be 
present in a counterfactual situation in which the object did not 
exist.3 
He calls this claim the Redundancy Thesis (or Thesis R for short), 
because it claims that object-dependent thoughts are redundant in the 
explanation of action. Notice that what N claims is always true R claims 
is never true. That is, N claims that it is always necessary to attribute 
object-dependent thoughts to an agent to explain his action upon an 
object; R, in contrast, claims that it is never necessary to do so. With a 
view to resolving this dispute in favour of N let us turn first to the argument 
for R. 
It will help to furnish ourselves with a typical twin example. The 
ubiquitous Ralph reaches out for a glass of lemonade on the kitchen 
counter. Why? Well, for a start, he has just come in from mowing the lawn 
on a hot summer day and so desires a thirst-quenching beverage and thinks 
to himself that lemonade is thirst-quenching. Meanwhile, over yonder, 
Twin Ralph, who is Ralph's doppelganger, also reaches out in an attempt 
to grasp a glass of lemonade which is not there-for Twin Ralph is 
hallucinating a glass of lemonade. 
The challenge to those who would defend Thesis N is to give an 
intentional psychological explanation for Twin Ralph's behaviour 
without attributing to him any object-dependent thoughts. Here we 
allegedly face an unwelcome dilemma. Either Twin Ralph's behaviour is 
rationally explicable or it is not. Suppose that it is not. This is an 
unacceptable consequence of the doctrine of object-dependent hought 
because deluded Twin Ralph does act rationally, and hence, his behaviour 
should be intentionally explicable.4 Suppose, on the other hand, that Twin 
Ralph's behaviour is explicable in terms of psychological states none of 
which include object-dependent houghts. If this is so, then the behaviour 
of non-deluded Ralph should be equally explainable without attributing 
3. 'Russellian Thoughts and Methodological Solipsism', in J. Butterfield, ed., Language, 
Mind and Logic (Cambridge: CUP, 1986), pp. 68-69; my emphasis. Unadorned references 
in the text are to this work. See also Noonan's 'Object-Dependent Thoughts and 
Psychological Redundancy', Analysis 51 (1991), cited as ODT. Essentially the same 
position and argument for it can be found in Gabriel Segal, 'The Return of the Individual', 
Mind xcviii (1989). Cf. Peter Carruthers, 'Russellian Thoughts', Mind xcvi (1987). 
IN DEFENCE OF OBJECT-DEPENDENT THOUGHTS 203 
to him object-dependent thoughts. Why does this follow? Well, Twin 
Ralph has a se_t of beliefs and desires that constitute a sufficient reason 
for reaching out. Call this set 'X'. Since Ralph is Twin Ralph's twin he 
has all of Twin Ralph's beliefs and desires and possibly some extra ones 
as well (namely, those object-dependent ones if there any such things); 
that is to say, he too has X. In other words, X is a subset of Ralph's 
thoughts. But X is sufficient reason for a subject to reach out-which is 
just what Ralph did. So X is sufficient to explain Ralph's behaviour as 
well as Twin Ralph's. So the 'extra' object-dependent houghts that Ralph 
allegedly has are redundant in explaining his action. 
The obvious objection to this argument is that the Ralphs do not do the 
same thing. For Ralph really does reach out for a glass of lemonade while 
Twin Ralph does not. Invoking Quine's relational idiom of attitude 
attribution, we can say that, in Ralph's case, a glass of lemonade is acted 
upon by him but no glass of lemonade is acted upon by Twin Ralph.5 The 
objection is that object-dependent thoughts are not redundant in 
explaining the action of Ralph relationally described. So the idea is that 
since X is the set of thoughts that explain deluded Twin Ralph's behaviour, 
it is not adequate to explain non-deluded Ralph's action relationally 
described. It is X plus some object-dependent singular thoughts that 
explains Ralph's actions vis-a-vis the glass of lemonade. 
To this objection the defender of Thesis R replies that while it is true 
that X alone cannot explain Ralph's action relationally described, X 
combined with mention of his environment can. That is, X together with 
the fact that there is a glass of lemonade in the offing, ensuring the truth of 
4. That Twin Ralph does act rationally is in fact a much more contentious claim than the 
advocate of Thesis R allows. Space limitations prevent me from discussing the interesting 
question of whether such pure hallucinators act rationally and, if so, given the multifarious 
meanings of 'rational', which sense of the term is being employed. Perhaps a few words are 
in order, however. One salient sense of 'rational' is that an agent acts rationally if there is a 
practical syllogism available to rationalize his behaviour. However, given that the anti-object- 
dependent theorists I am responding to (especially Segal, op. cit.) seem committed to the 
view that the empty demonstrative thoughts of the pure hallucinator do not have truth 
conditions it is hard to see how they could figure as premises in a practical syllogism from 
which an agent could reason. Segal, e.g., follows Tyler Burge and Kent Bach in holding that 
such thoughts have the same kind of content as open sentences; what is unclear, however, is 
whether he follows Burge in advocating a free logic in which empty token applications of 
predicates come out false, or Bach in advocating the view that such token applications simply 
lack truth conditions. For details see Burge, 'Russell's Problem and Intentional Identity', in 
James Tomberlin, ed., Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World (Hackett, 1983) and 
Kent Bach, 'De Re Belief and Methodological Solipsism', in Andrew Woodfield, ed., 
Thought and Object (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982). The upshot is twofold: more work 
needs to be done to show, first, that impalement on the first horn of the dilemma is such a bad 
thing, and second, that anti-object-dependent theorists are themselves entitled to the claim 
that the pure hallucinator acts rationally. 
5. For the distinction between relational and notional attributions see W. V. Quine, 
'Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes', reprinted in his Ways of Paradox and otherEssays 
(New York: Random House, 1966). 
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the relational description, explains Ralph's action. I shall call this the dual- 
component (D-C) conception of relational psychological explanation 
because it invokes two components: a purely psychological component 
and a non-psychological component.6 So even under a relational 
description, there is still no need to cite object-dependent thoughts to 
explain actions. 
II 
The problem with the dual-component reply to the objection from 
relational characterization is that one of its key assumptions is false: 
namely, the claim that 'an adequate psychological explanation of an 
action under a non-relational description, together with a description of 
the surrounding circumstances in which that action constitutes an action 
answering to some relational description, provides an adequate 
psychological explanation of it under the relational description' (ODT, 
p. 4). That is to say, it is simply not true that X supplemented with a 
description of Ralph's surroundings-namely, that there was a glass of 
lemonade so located that Ralph made contact with it-is an adequate 
explanation of Ralph's behaviour vis-a-vis the lemonade. 
To see this, consider the possible situation in which Ralph hallucinates 
a glass of lemonade on the counter and, luckily, there also happens to be 
a glass of lemonade on the counter matching the hallucinatory content and 
so positioned that, although Ralph does not perceive it, he grasps it. The 
tu quoque challenge to the dual-component heorist is to explain Ralph's 
action (relationally described) in this situation in a way that does not imply 
that he did the same thing (relationally described) as the Ralph in the 
normal situation, that is, that does not imply that he intentionally, that is, 
deliberately, grasped the glass. It seems reasonable to think that the 
explanation of an action in such a case of 'veridical hallucination' should 
be different from the explanation of action in the normal veridical case. 
This is so because the actions are different: Ralph intentionally grasps the 
glass of lemonade whereas Lucky Ralph, as I will call him, does not. 
The key question, then, is: Can the D-C model distinguish the two 
cases? It would seem not. For consider what the D-C explanation of Lucky 
Ralph's action of (unintentionally) grasping the glass will be. It will 
presumably consist in the citation of X (for, by hypothesis, Lucky Ralph's 
thoughts are also a subset of Ralph's thoughts) and the fact that there was 
a glass in the offing. But this is the same explanation that the D-C 
conception gives of Ralph's action of intentionally grasping the glass. But 
Ralph and Lucky Ralph do different things and so presumably their 
behaviour should not be given the same explanation. So the D-C 
conception is not a correct account of relational explanation. What is 
6. It is endorsed by Noonan, Segal, and Carruthers. 
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missing from the account is Ralph's intending, of the lemonade, that he 
grasp it. The most that the dual-component conception can explain is 
Ralph's action relationally described as his picking up that glass of 
lemonade. It cannot explain his action relationally described as his 
intentionally picking up that glass of lemonade. 
Noonan is aware of the threat that cases of veridical hallucination pose 
for the D-C model. Unfortunately, he misdiagnoses the nature of the threat 
and thus his response falls far short of dealing with the real problem. 
Noonan sees the asymmetry between the two cases of Ralph and Lucky 
Ralph as one where Lucky Ralph's grasping the glass is a coincidence 
whereas Ralph's is not. This seems to be a problem because there is a 
sense in which coincidences have no explanation and so unlike Ralph, 
Lucky Ralph's behaviour should, in a sense, be inexplicable. The D-C 
theorist, however, seems committed not only to the explicability of Lucky 
Ralph's behaviour but also to its being explicable in exactly the same way 
as Ralph's behaviour. Noonan, however, 'wish[es] to explain the intuitive 
difference between the two cases by reference to the difference between 
knowledge and (accidentally) true belief' (ODT, p. 7). The idea is that 
since Ralph knows that there is a glass in front of him his grasping it is 
no coincidence; whereas since Lucky Ralph has a merely accidentally 
true belief it is a coincidence that he grasps the glass. 'But if this is the 
explanation of the intuitive difference between the two cases', Noonan 
concludes, 'then since knowledge and belief can have the very same 
content, nothing in the set-up requires us to say that some object- 
dependent psychological states had by non-deluded [Ralph] are essential 
to the adequate psychological explanation of his action' (Ibid.). 
Two things can be said in response to this appeal to the distinction 
between knowledge and accidentally true belief. First of all, with a bit of 
Gettier-style stage-setting the example can be rigged so that it is not a 
coincidence that there is an object matching the hallucinatory content of 
Lucky Ralph's thought. We merely need to imagine that either the object 
itself is the cause of the matching hallucination or both the presence of 
the object and the matching hallucination have a common cause. In both 
versions it will true that if the object had not been there then the 
hallucination would not have occurred. Though I omit the fine details, the 
nature of such admittedly bizarre examples is familiar from the literature 
on the causal theory of perception and perceptual knowledge. In such an 
augmented version of Lucky Ralph's story it is not a coincidence that he 
grasps a glass of lemonade (and so he is not really lucky) and so his belief 
that there is a glass of lemonade in front of him is not accidentally true; 
there is a perfectly good explanation of why his belief is true. Moreover, 
according to some externalist accounts of knowledge, in the augmented 
version of the story Lucky Ralph does know that there is a glass in front 
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of him.7 No doubt there are also accounts of knowledge according to 
which Lucky Ralph does not know there is a glass in front of him. So, at 
the end of the day, this appeal to knowledge has the consequence of 
shifting into the domain of epistemology the debate over whether the 
Ralphs do the same thing and whether their actions should be given the 
same explanation. Fortunately, as we shall shortly see, a resolution of this 
puzzle does not await the arrival of the correct theory of knowledge. 
The second point is that even in the original unaugmented version the 
distinction between Ralph's knowledge and Lucky Ralph's accidentally 
true belief does not secure a relevant difference between the two cases. 
For recall that the knowledge reply to the example of veridical 
hallucination turns essentially on the correct claim that knowledge and 
belief can have the same intentional content. Notice, however, that since, 
by hypothesis, Lucky Ralph does not perceive the glass in front of him, 
the content of his accidentally true belief cannot be demonstrative- 
whether or not demonstrative thoughts are object-dependent; rather, it 
must be an existentially quantified content such as that there is a glass in 
front of him. Indeed, it may already have been noticed that what Noonan 
says that Ralph knows is that there is a glass in front of him. But Noonan 
cannot appeal to such a shared existentially quantified content to explain 
the Ralphs' actions for he agrees with his opponents that the explanation 
of at least certain kinds of action upon objects does require the attribution 
of demonstrative thoughts-his point is that demonstrative thoughts are 
not object-dependent.8 So it is agreed on all sides that it is a shared 
demonstrative content that is needed to explain the Ralphs' actions-or, 
at least there will be cases where this is true; but the knowledge reply offers 
only an existential content and so fails to secure the needed distinction 
between the intentional explanations of what the Ralphs did. 
In any case, it seems to me that coincidence is not the intuitive 
difference between the two cases; or rather, even if it is a difference it is 
not the deepest difference. For the source of the coincidence lies, not in 
a lack of knowledge, but in the absence of intention. The reason that 
Lucky Ralph only coincidentally picks up the glass in front of him is not 
that it is an accident that there happens to be a glass in front of him; rather, 
it is a coincidence because he did not intend to pick up that glass. The 
distinction between knowledge and accidentally true belief does not 
secure a distinction between intending to pick up that glass of lemonade 
and accidentally picking it up. 
7. See, e.g., Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 
p. 190. 
8. I should emphasize that my criticisms are directed at those theorists-e.g., Burge, Bach, 
Segal, Noonan, and Carruthers-who agree that demonstrative thoughts are not reducible 
to descriptive thoughts. 
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What more than the set X and the fact that there is a glass of lemonade 
in front of him is needed to ensure that Ralph picks it up intentionally? 
Obviously Ralph has to intend to pick it up. But what is it for Ralph to 
intend to pick it up? What does Ralph have that Lucky Ralph does not 
have which allows us to say that he intentionally picked up the glass? We 
have seen that knowledge of the purely existential fact that there is a glass 
in front of him does not allow us to say that Ralph intentionally picked 
up that glass. In the absence of any other candidates, I submit that it is 
the fact that Ralph has object-dependent demonstrative thoughts about 
the glass of lemonade whereas Lucky Ralph does not. That is to say, for 
example, Ralph desires to drink that glass of lemonade; Ralph believes 
that that glass of lemonade will be thirst-quenching; believes that his wife 
set it out for him to drink, that it is his favourite glass... etc. None of this 
is true of Lucky Ralph: he has no thoughts at all about the glass of 
lemonade.9 The reason for this is clear: he does not perceive the glass. 
This is just a particular instance of what I would conjecture is a general 
thesis: namely, that a necessary condition for an agent to act intentionally 
upon an object is that the agent have some object-dependent houghts 
about that object. I think it is this thesis that drives the lurking suspicion 
that reference to X and the mere presence of a glass in the offing falls 
short of providing a satisfactory explanation of Ralph's intentional action 
vis-a-vis the glass. The dual-component conception seems to drain away 
the genuine agency of individuals. 
The D-C model suffers further related defeats as well, as can be 
illustrated by the following case. Unbeknownst o Ralph, his wife is trying 
to kill him and has put some poison in his lemonade. Poor thirsty Ralph 
swills down the poison. His action can now be relationally described as 
the imbibing of poison. How do we explain his action thus relationally 
characterized according to the D-C conception? Well, we say that Ralph 
had X and the poison was strategically-or rather, tragically-positioned 
in his environment. These two facts suffice to explain Ralph's action 
relationally so characterized. Of course, Ralph did not intend to imbibe 
the, or indeed any, poison. But he did intend to drink the lemonade. This 
points out the fact that the important difference between the actions of 
Ralph and Twin Ralph is not merely the fact that the former's action can 
be described relationally in terms of the presence of a glass while the 
latter's cannot. For Ralph's action can be given any number of relational 
descriptions that Twin Ralph's cannot-but not all of these relational 
descriptions are the relevant explanandum of a psychological explanation 
9. At least not until the moment when he grasps the glass. Or, if his hallucination persists 
even after that moment and is multi-modal, then he has no object-dependent houghts until 
his hallucination subsides. 
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of intentional action.10 There is a further constraint on what relational 
descriptions are relevant: they must be ones that the agent would 
recognize as descriptions of his intended action. But since the singular 
term designating the object acted upon in the second environmental 
component of the D-C explanation occurs in transparent position, because 
it falls outside the scope of the agent's psychological attitude, it is hard 
to see how the D-C model can meet this constraint. While the D-C 
conception can explain relational facts such as that Ralph unintentionally 
imbibed poison, it appears powerless to explain certain other relational 
facts such as that Ralph intentionally drank the lemonade. Unfortunately 
for the D-C conception, what is needed to explain these latter type of 
relational facts are object-dependent houghts. But since none of these 
object-dependent houghts will appear in the subset X, it plus additional 
environmental factors are insufficient to explain Ralph's action of 
intentionally picking up the glass of lemonade and drinking it. 
Turning to another shortcoming of the D-C model, it is pretty clear that 
what makes Ralph's action an intentional reaching for a glass of lemonade 
is not, as Noonan claims, 'simply' the presence of the lemonade (ODT, 
p. 4) or, as Gabriel Segal puts it, the fact that the lemonade 'is around' (p. 
45), so that the bodily movements brought about by X can be described 
relationally. The lemonade must also causally affect him in some way. Or 
rather, in the situation as it actually happened, it was the lemonade's 
causally affecting Ralph that caused him to form the intention of drinking 
it. It follows from this that if there had been no lemonade then Ralph 
would not have reached out as he did. Given Ralph's antecedent desire 
for a thirst-quenching beverage, it also follows that if the glass of 
lemonade had been on the other counter then Ralph would have moved 
towards that counter instead. Or if there had been a glass of cider on the 
counter then Ralph still would have reached out in the way he did (given 
that he has the appropriate general beliefs about cider). 
The general point we are converging on, of course, is that psychological 
explanations, like all causal explanations, support counterfactuals. But the 
dual-component explanation of Ralph's action, as stated by the defenders 
of Thesis R, fails to sustain the relevant counterfactuals. Recall that on the 
D-C conception Ralph moves the way he does because of that subset of 
this thoughts, X, that he shares with Twin Ralph. The additional environ- 
mental factor of the presence of the lemonade is thrown in so as to ensure 
that we can describe his bodily movements relationally. But if all that is 
causing Ralph to move his body in the manner in which he does is X then 
10. If I understand him aright, this is another way of putting Christopher Peacocke's point, 
in 'Extemalist Explanation', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society XCII (1993), that 
'Quite generally, explanation of a truth by a given set of states is not preserved by 
substitution of coextensive predicates in that truth' (p. 208). 
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it follows that he might have done so whether or not the lemonade was 
present. To counter this absurd consequence, the D-C explanation must, 
as Christopher Peacocke notes, be 'supplemented with a batch of 
specifications of the external relations in which bodily movements would 
have stood under various different external antecedent conditions' (p. 208) 
and 'as we add more and more relational specifications to the original 
explanation involving only an internalist state, the question arises of 
whether we are not in fact adding sufficient material to ensure that the 
subject is, after all, in an externalist state' (p. 209). The question arises, 
moreover, as to whether such a batch of supplementary specifications is 
not sufficient to ensure that the subject is no longer in a psychological state 
that is shared by his hallucinating doppelgdnger. 
III 
I turn finally and very briefly to the rather different point that object- 
dependent thoughts have a further utility which can be brought out by 
switching to consideration of the prediction of action. The idea I have in 
mind is that knowing which object-dependent thoughts an agent has 
allows us to predict which object he will in fact act on. So the question I 
wish to close with is whether we can predict which object an agent will 
act upon-that is, what the agent will in fact do-without the help of 
object-dependent thought attributions. Is reference to object-dependent 
thoughts also redundant in the prediction of action? 
Suppose Ralph goes into the kitchen in quest of a glass of lemonade. 
As it happens there is also a glass of gin and tonic on the counter next to 
the glass of lemonade. Let us imagine what a D-C style prediction of 
Ralph's behaviour would look like. Suppose, for example, what the 
defenders of Thesis R do suppose, that the set X can contain 
demonstrative thoughts, such as wanting to drink that glass of lemonade, 
even in the absence of an object for them to be about. 1 I Such an attribution 
is not existentially committing: it does not license the Quinean relational 
attribution that the glass of lemonade is such that Ralph wants to drink it; 
so it is a belief that deluded Twin Ralph could also have. Does knowing 
that Ralph wants to drink that glass of lemonade, where this is an 
attribution of an object-independent demonstrative thought, enable us to 
predict that Ralph will reach out for the glass of lemonade? Not unless it 
is in fact the glass of lemonade that is believed by Ralph to be the glass 
of lemonade. If it is the gin and tonic that is mistakenly believed by Ralph 
to be the glass of lemonade then it is the gin and tonic that he will reach 
out for and not the glass of lemonade. Since such object-independent 
11. For reasons given in footnote 8 1 set aside descriptive thoughts. 
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demonstrative thoughts do not entail the truth of any relational attribution, 
we can always ask the question: Which object is it that is believed by Ralph 
to be that glass? Until we know the answer to this question we will not 
be in a position to predict which object Ralph will act upon. 
I conclude, then, against the Redundancy Thesis, that far from being 
redundant in the explanation and prediction of action upon objects, 
reference to object-dependent thoughts plays an essential role in such 
endeavours. The Necessity Thesis stands fast.12 
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12. Thanks to Sarah Sawyer, Rowland Stout, Galen Strawson, audiences at Sheffield 
University and Oxford University's Wolfson Society, and especially Martin Davies and 
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